The purpose of this research is to explore the IPO pricing behavior in an underwriting system by applying the fuzzy game theory. Results of this study are: (1) The application of the fuzzy game theory is more consistent with the uncertainty relationship of human interference between independent and dependent variables in practice with profit return function as a potential function. Rewards for underwriters can be judged according to the principle of experience, which copes with actual situations more properly. (2) Differences of satisfaction exist between underwriters and issuing companies for IPO pricing in the underwriting system. Profit or satisfaction exchange can be conducted appropriately during the process of negotiating offering prices. (3) The comparison of profit changes and satisfaction sensitivity between underwriters and issuing companies can be served as a reference of exchange and increase in satisfaction for underwriters and issuing companies
Introduction
The initial public offerings (IPO) have been well documented. Based on practical operations the way to calculate a reasonable offering price has not yet been reached. One of the potential reasons is that the offering price evaluation model currently applied is not ideal as the existing relevant evaluation approaches. In fact, offering prices are determined through negotiation between underwriters and issuing companies (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003) . The purpose of this research is to apply and extend the fuzzy game theory to an IPO pricing process.
The Model
The total subscription number was a reciprocal of the offering price. Thus, the actual subscription number is as follow: (3) : In a cooperative game, the united profit of public companies and the underwriters is the sum of profits on both sides. 
and shown as α-cut.
The maximum and minimum profit functions for underwriters and public companies are as follow:
If the maximum profit function of an underwriter is: 
The best combination is to locate
, then:
Empirical Study
The objects in this study are Company A, Company B and Company C and the cut ! " of P/E approach (Table 1) revealed that underwriter handling fee revenue decreased as the fuzzy value ( ! ) increased.
An increase in ! could result in increase in lottery odds, which not only renders a reduction in the total number of application offerings and processing fee revenue, and also a decrease in total underwriting profit. Table 2 shows the requirements for the least satisfaction, the issuing company would require sacrificing the underwriter's profit goal or make use of the fuzzy goals on both sides. When the least satisfaction level of Company A is 0.3887 and the profit satisfaction level is limited to 0.379, 0.399. As this is inconsistent with the satisfaction interval of the underwriter, the underwriter may accept reduced satisfaction to seek a more suitable profit satisfaction level for both parties (see Table 3 ). 
Conclusions
The purpose of this study is to explore how to calculate the maximum profit and the optimum offering price or achieve the maximum profit goals for both parties through pricing models when the underwriter and the public company maintain a cooperative relationship. Profit functions of the underwriter and the public company are linear programmed and fuzzy variables are rationalized thru an interactive fuzzy game programming for the solutions to the maximum profit and the optimum offering price on both sides. Besides, both parties may exchange profits to promote satisfaction when the underwriter sets up the least satisfaction level.
